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Ogden uses two criteria, appropriateness and
credibility, in formulating a christology. By using
these two criteria, he criticizes both traditional
and revisionary christologies. Traditional christo-
logies are now no longer credible to our human under-
standing, while revisionary christologies are not
appropriate to Christian faith, or more precisely,
to the apostolic witness. Using the ideas of existen-
tial philosophy and process theology, he then estab-
lishes his christology of freedom and love.
But to use the apostolic witness to Jesus Christ
as the appropriate subject of his christology, instead
of Jesus Christ himself, as in other christologies,
presents a problem. Has he forsaken Jesus Christ as
the foundation of Christianity? Ogden's answer is
no. For the apostolic witness is, in fact, itself
rooted in Jesus Christ. A distinction is made between
empirical-historical Jesus, and existential-histori-
cal Jesus. The former refers to the so-called histo-
rical Jesus, while the latter, to the same historical
Jesus as contained in the apostolic witness. In this
sense the apostolic witness to Jesus Christ is the
appropiate and only subject of Christology.
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INTRODUCTION
Christology can be regarded as one of the central
themes of Christian theology. To me, to study chris-
tology is to learn the heart of theology. I have chosen
the christology of Schubert Ogden, a living American
theologian, for my thesis because I want to learn theo-
logy from him, especially concerning the contemporary
christological discussion.
During my studies and discussions with my adviser,
I found that the apostolic witness to Jesus on which
Ogden' s christology is based is interesting as well as
instructive. Hence the choice of subject for this
thesis.
Each kind of theology has a set of presupposi-
tions which, in turn, affects the whole framework of
that theology. The presuppositions of a theologian
may be manifested as his basic concepts in doing theo-
logy. Ogden is no exception. He presupposes that
theology and hence christology must be intelligible
today, but finds that this is not the case of chris-
tologies today as well as in the past.
The first chapter of this thesis deals with Ogden' s
basic concepts. We then examine how he uses the crite-
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ria of appropriateness and credibility to reject tradi-
tional and modern revisionary christologies (chapter
two), before we present Ogden's christology (chapter
three). It is a methological problem when Ogden bases
his christology on the apostolic witness to Jesus,
rather than on the historical Jesus, who is commonly
asserted as the subject of any christology (chapter
four). Before the final conclusion, we present a criti-
cal reflection in which we query Ogden's basic concepts
and his method in formulating his christology as well
as christology's relevance to Asia (chapter five).
The problem in chapter four is, in fact, the
focus of the thesis. The first half of this chapter
tries to clarify Ogden' s standpoint concerning the
apostolic witness to Jesus as the christological sub-
ject. In the second half, we let Ogden respond to
criticism made to the apostolic witness. And we try
to participate in the above dialogue in the fifth and
last chapter.
In preparing this thesis, we try to keep close
to Ogden himself and let him speak. Therefore, the
sources used, with a few exceptions, are primary (es-
pecially his book The Point of Christology in 1982).
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In chapter four, the main references are to J. Hick's
criticism in The Journal of Religion, 1984, and Ogden's
response to critics, including Hick, presented in the
Currents in Comtemporary Christology Group, sponsored
by the American Academy of Religion in December 1984.
Theological constructions including christological
formulations are hardly perfect. Moreover, it would
be no surprise if Ogden would further develop his ideas
as long as he is still living. So our study of Ogden
in this thesis is only part of an ongoing process.
4I HIS BASIC CONCEPTS
Being a contemporary theologian, Schubert Ogden
is concerned with the Christian message, whether it
is credible or understandable for today. This con-
cern leads him to establish two criteria, namely,
appropriateness and credibility, in judging any theo-
logical statement. Theology must attempt to under-
stand God in a way that is appropriate to the Chris-
tian witness and understandable in terms of human
existence (FF 17). When the Christian message is
thus presented, people are challenged to make a res-
ponsible decision either to accept or to reject this
message or witness (FF 29).
Similarly, any christology of reflection today
or in the past, in Ogden's view, must satisfy these
two criteria. Christology has to be appropriate to
the meaning of the apostolic witness, as well as cre-
dible to human existence when judged by common human
experience and reason (PC 4).
1. Appropriateness
Ogden himself is aware of the difficulty of ap-
plying the criteriion of appropriateness in theology.
He cannot accept scriptures as the standard or norm
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of theological appropriateness that Protestant theo-
logians have traditionally given. It is because
the New Testament writings as a whole are not ori-
ginal witness to Jesus Christ, and thus not truly
apostolic (FF 45). But how does Ogden understand
to be what is truly original apostolic witness?
Ogden believes that the truly apostolic witness
is contained in the earliest layer of witness as found
in the New Testament. We can reconstruct them through
historical-critical study of the Synoptic Gospels.
This apostolic witness is contained in the New Testa-
ment canon because one of the criteria of forming
this canon was by the determination whether a writing
is apostolic or not. This criterion enables the New
Testament canon we have today to be, at least par-
tially, apostolic (FF 45-46).
Ogden adds later a theological reason why all
Christian witness and theology necessarily depend
on this apostolic witness. It is because Jesus Christ
is the primal authorizing source. The authority
of the apostolic witness is derived from him, the
primal authorizing source. Jesus Christ can be re-
garded as the primal authorizing source because he
is the decisive re-presentation of the ultimate rea-
lity of God and its meaning to us (PC 102-103).
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2. Credibility
Ogden wants to explicate the Christian message
to the secular world because he regards this is the
very nature of the theological task (CM 17). There
are two ways of explicating the Christian faith today.
Firstly, theological task must deal with the problems
and tasks of the present. Secondly, it must main-
tain constant conversation with analogous attempts
made in the past (CM 15). We shall see later when
Ogden presents his christology, he identifies the
present problems of the world as well as criticizes
other past attempts in christological formulation.
The true significance of the Christian message
will be fully disclosed when we interpret the event
of Jesus Christ not as an objective event of the
past, but a personal appeal addressed to our present
self-understanding (CM 94). This is the method we
commonly called existential interpretation. By
using this method, theologians explicate the old mes-
sage about Jesus to the secular world now. In other
words, its aim is to find out the existential mean-
ing of the old message to us.
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a) Existential Interpretation
Ogden regards the question of christology
to be an existential one. To illustrate: consider-
ing the title Son of God in John 1:18, he ar-
gues that the implication of this christologcial
assertion is not only who Jesus is, but also
who God is (PC 25). Considering also the seven
claims of Jesus, e.g., I am the bread of Life
in the same Gospel, Ogden argues that the more
appropriate translation, based on Bultmann's
interpretation, should be The Bread of Life--
it is I [Jesus]. It means that the real ques-
tion (who Jesus the being is) is, in fact, Who
or what is the Bread of Life? (PC 26). This
is clearly concerned with the ulitimate exis-
tence of human beings. So, for christology,
there are three questions together:
Who am I (our self-understanding)?
Who is God (the ultimate reality)?
Who is Jesus (meaning of ultimate reality
to us)?
In fact, they are the existential questions
(with the ultimate meaning of one's very exis-
tence as a human being), or the question of faith
(basic presupposition underlying behind it),
or the religious question (the above two ques-
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tions asked and answered in the primary forri
of culture) (PC 27-30). The existential ques-
tion has two essential aspects, i.e., metaphy-
sical and moral, each implying the other (PC
34-35). By answering the question who God is,
we identify someone or something that deci-
sively re-presents God, namely, Jesus, who iE
in the position of relating human existence tc
the ultimate reality (PC 37).
Firstly, concerning the question Who am
I?, Ogden regards man's desire for reassurance,
and for a general confidence about the future
are the limiting questions at the level of self-
conscious belief (RG 31). Ogden interprets
the parable of the Last Judgment in Matthew 25:
31-46 as not intending to express that we must
confess faith in Jesus Christ, but that we must
understand ourselves in a given situation of
our authentic existence that is an original pos-
sibility of our life before God (CM 144). Our
possibility to actualize our self- understanding
or self -existence is rooted in our relation to
the ultimate source of our existence (CM 140).
Therefore, Ogden believes that faith in God is
finally unavoidable because it is inescapable
at the deeper level of our actual existence
(RG 42). In this sense, he agrees with the say-
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ing that Man without God is dehumanized (RG
46).
Secondly, concerning the question Who is
God?, Ogden thinks that if theology is credible
and relevant to human existence, its statements
must be at least implicitly about man and his
possibility of self-understanding. In this
understanding, any statements about God and God's
activity are statements about human existence,
and vice versa (CM 137). This is the fact
that we must need process philosophy, apart from
existentialism, to explicate Christian faith.
Thirdly, concerning the question Who is
Jesus?, Ogden affirms that Jesus as the Christ
is the decisive re-presentation (or presenting
again through concepts and symbols) of God's
gift and demand of faith, which will not cease
to be present in our existence (FF 55). The
life of Jesus represents our original possibility
of existence before God. Jesus Christ bears
the eternal word of God's love, which is the
transcendent meaning of all creatures, and before
which final event we must decide our own exis-
tence (CM 160).
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In considering the above three questions, we
notice that the existential question of christology
helps us to grasp the meaning of the ultimate reality
to us through Jesus Christ, who acts as the deci-
sive re-presentation of ultimate reality to human
beings. On the other hand, Ogden is also aware of
the inadequacy of this method when he interprets
the Christian faith in existential terms. Ogden
criticizes Bultmann's existential interpretation,
firstly, as making the Christian faith to be merely
our freedom from the past and openess for the future
which constitute possibility of our authentic exis-
tence (CM 113). Secondly, this interpretation under-
cuts the understanding of human beings before God,
according to the New Testament (CM 115). And final-
ly, we cannot say we need Jesus Christ in any clear
and specific way, but only a new self- understand-
ing in overcoming the hindrance of the possibility
of our authentic existence (CM 121).
Existential interpretation, in other words,
can at most speak about God and his activity in terms
of human existence theology is in danger of becom-
ing anthropology. The reason behind this problem
in existential interpretation is due to its underly-
ing existential philosophy which is inadequate when
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we want to speak about God, or theology. But
to do so- in terms of traditional theism is un-
acceptable to secular human beings today. Ogden
therefore seeks a more appropriate philosophy,
in speaking about God. This leads to process
theology.
b) Process Theology
It is not the aim here to examine process
philosophy or theology. We limit ourselves
only to its relevant ideas in Ogden' s chris-
tology, i.e., how Ogden uses these ideas to
talk about God objectively, in order not to
reduce theology to anthropology as existential-
ism does.
To begin with, Ogden takes freedom as
the key concept in process metaphysics. Meta-
physics, he understands, is the
form of critical reflection
which seeks to make fully ex-
plicit and understandable the
most foundamental presuppo-
sitions of all our experience
and thought, or, the
most universal principles that
are the. strictly necessary
conditions of the possibility
of anything whatever (FF 73).
In this metaphysics, anything that is is
the result of the process of creative synthesis,
or of self-creation. It freely creates itself.
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During this process, it freely responds to other
things that are either self-created in the past,
or possibilities which belong to the future
(FF 74-76).
There are two consequences that are of cri-
tical theological importance. Firstly, there
is nothing (including God) that can completely
determine the being of others. It is because
the others have the freedom to respond to it,
either accepting or rejecting it partly or to-
tally. Secondly, everything (including God),
is being determined partially by the being of
the others.- It is because during the self-crea-
ting process, nothing can actualize itself with-
out the existing data provided by the others
(FF 79). In theology, it means God loves hu-
mankind means that God acts on human beings
for their sake. But, human beings have the
liberty to accept or reject God's love.
Classical theism takes the nature of God
to be absolute in itself. But that is only
a one-sided concept of God, for God has to be
related to all things at the same time. The
only satisfactory concept of God, in neo-classi-
cal. theism, takes God to be two-sided or di-
polar (RG 48). This results in the view that
God is literally becoming as well as being,
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and hence the relative as well as the absolute,
the changing as well as the unchanging, the con-
tingent as well as the necessary (PC 143).
The concept of this God may further be clari-
fied by the concept of love. From our common
experience, love has two poles: loving and be-
ing loved. This is part of the dipolar charac-
teristics in our relation with others, as we are
acting on and being acted upon by others. By
this analogy, we may understand what God is like
in being dipolar. In fact, the concept of love
may help to describe the structure of ultimate
reality in itself. God as boundless love is a
distinct center of universal interact ion,.
. being acted on by all things as well as acting
on them (PC 145).
This description of the nature of love as
interaction applies not only to God in relation
to the world but also to the inter-relation of
things in the world. On the human level the most
significance of conscious and pruposive action
is clear. To love one's neighbout as oneself
means to act and be acted upon in relation to
them in full freedom and responsibility. it means
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also to support structures of human relationship
in one's- culture ans society, in which justice
and human rights are established, and the possi-
bility of authentic existence is made available
to every person.
To sum up, Ogden applies two criteria in for-
mulating theological statements,, first, whether
they are appropriate to the norm of apostolic
witness, and second, whether they are credible
today. A christology today should explicate the
meaning of the apostolic witness to us, in ans-
wering the three inseparable questions concerning
God, Jesus, and ourselves, in terms of existen-
tial interpretation. But it is process philoso-
phy or theology that provides the terms to ex-
plicate metaphysically the concept of God.
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II OBJECTION TO OTHER CHRISTOLOGIES
Ogden is critical of the formulation of chris-
tology from the ground of the words and acts of the
historical Jesus. He is concerned with whether such
a christological formulation as developed in the past
is appropriate to the apostolic witness and is credible
to human understanding today.
In order to understand how Ogden establishes
his christology, which he hopes is both appropriate
and credible in our situation, by using the apostolic
witness to Jesus, we examine how he rejects christo-
logies of the past, as well as, of the present in this
chapter.
1. Traditional Christology
Ogden believes that the traditional chr-istology
based on scripture and dogma is problematic. The first
reason is the change of the modern scientific view
of the world and the modern understanding of human
existence from the past, as formulated by R. Bultmann
(PC 6).
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The world view of the New Testament's time was
a three folded one, with the heaven above, the earth
central, the hell beneath (Bultmann 1954: 1). At that
time, people believed that supernatural powers, whether
good or bad, might participate in their lives. These
powers influenced also their behaviour.
Today, with the knowledge of modern natural
science, we can hardly understand the world view of
the past. But, our world is a regulated whole governed
by natural laws. Our existence, on the one hand, is
no longer bound by supernatural powers, but still by
the political, social, economic injustices of our
society. On the other hand, our existence need to
be actualized if we want to have an authentic one.
Our different world view from the past thus leads
us to a different understanding of human existence,
and hence a different moral principle. It is because
Ogden believes, according to the view point of modern
anthropology, our morality is rooted in our world view
(PC 31-32). Furthermore, if we try to understand the
christology of scripture literally, we fail inevitably
to get its meaning or its truth (PC 6).
Secondly, even though the first reason is enough
to explain why many theologians cannot accept the
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traditional christology of scripture, Ogden, neverthe-
less, finds that there are three further difficulties
in the traditional christology of scripture and dogma:
a) The metaphysical concepts and religious symbols
of the traditional doctrine of incarnation are now
outmoded and inadequate in some important respects.
It is even questionable whether this doctrine is
appropriate to the apostolic witness, and whether
it is based upon adequate christological reflection
(PC 7-8).
b) The traditional doctrine of incarnation is unable
to give any real content of its talk of Jesus as
both God and man (PC 8). Through the long history
of attempts to present a reasoned account of Christ
as both fully human and fully divine, the church
has never quite succeeded in offering a consistent
or convincing picture (PC 9).
c) The traditional doctrine of incarnation has usually
run into the difficulty of implicitly denying the
true humanity of Jesus Christ (PC 10). Not only
does this difficulty refer to the neo-Chlacedonian-
ism, but it also refers to the kenot icism emergent
in nineteenth-century theology (PC 10).
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2. Revisionary Christology
Since Traditional christology is problematic,
Ogden himself, as other contemporary theologians, ex-
plores the alternative of a revisionary christology.
By doing so, he sets two requirements. Firstly, the
meaning and the truth of the revisionary christology
must be founded upon the earliest Christian witness.
Secondly, it must be understandable today. In other
words, the revisionary christology must be appropriate
to the apostolic witness and be credible to human under-
standing today.
We have just noted what the problems of under-
standing the New Testament are. Ogden believes that
we cannot take this historical source literaly to re-
construct the revisionary christology. In order to
find out its meaning, as in Bultmann's demythologizing,
we have to interpret it existentially thus recognizing
the truth it expresses. In the second criterion, namely
credibility, Ogden thinks that the revisionary chris-
tology has to provide alternative metaphysical concepts
and religious symbols in order that we may at least
understand what it wants to convey to us today (PC
12).
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Contemporary theologians use different methods
and approaches to handle the New Testament as empiri-
cal-historical sources, in making revisionary chris-
tologies. Ogden thinks that they are unsuccessful
because the New Testament itself is not an appropriate
source to reconstruct the historical Jesus. And even
if they could find it, Ogden insists that the historical
Jesus is not the appropriate subject to reconstruct
the revisionary christology. Furthermore, contemporary
theologians tend to exhibit more extensive agreement
with the traditional positions, thus hindering them
to present alternative concepts and symbols for our
understanding today. This is because their way of
asking the question of christology is not really dif-
ferent from that of traditional christology, however
different their way of answering it (PC 13-15).
According to Ogden, they are agreed on three
specific points.
a) Who is Jesus: the Being of Jesus
Ogden thinks that Who is Jesus? is the quest-
ion christology properly asks and answers. This
is understood that revisionary theologians are
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"asking about the being of Jesus in himself as dis-
tinct from asking about the meaning of Jesus for
us (PC 15-16).
Since we all know the problems of traditional
christology, revisionary theologians also realize
the difficulties behind it when we think and speak
of Jesus as uniquely God in man. This is under-
stood to say that Jesus' nature is God, as distin-
guished from ordinary people. Nevertheless, they
do think and speak of Jesus as uniquely man of
God whatever his relation to other human beings.
In existential terms, Jesus has actualized per-
fectly his possibility or authentic self-understand-
ing. It is clear now, to Ogden, that even though
revisionary theologians present another answer to
the christological question, they ask, actually,
the same question: What is the being of Jesus in
himself (PC 16)?
In fact, Ogden does not say that christology
excludes the question of the being of Jesus. But
to assume as revisionary theologians do that this
is the only question christology answers, is the
mistake they make (PC 27-28).
Yet, one may argue for the revisionary theo-
logians: they do not ask who is Jesus? as the
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only question, but as the primary question for chris-
tology. It is because one has to know what/who the
being of Jesus is (the first question) before
one can infer the meaning of this Jesus for us
today (the second question).
To Ogden, these are two loosely connected
questions, besides the difficulty of historical
inquiry involved, one may just ask either one
of them, but they are not directly coherent to
each other. As we have seen in chapter one, this
question: who is Jesus? is, in fact, the third
of three inseparable questions. The other two
questions are who is God? and who am I?, which
are of equal importance. He explains again:
In other words, these other two
aspects of the christological ques-
tion are not only essential to it,
they are also fundamental to its
third aspect. For unless one were
already asking about one's own iden-
tity and the identity of the myste-
rious ultimate reality upon which
one's being and meaning are depen-
dent, one neither would nor could
ask the question Who is Jesus?
in the distinctive sense in which
it is asked in asking the question
of christology (PC 29).
Therefore, the question christology ans-
wers is not simple but complex. And Ogden calls
it an existential-historical question which does
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ask about what has actually happened, but, by
asking so, it asks about, at the same time, its
meaning for us here and now in the present, or
its meaning for the earliest Christians, rather
than its being in itself then and there in the
past (PC 39-40).
b) Who is Jesus: the Historical Subject of the Chris-
tological Question
If the christological question concerning
Jesus himself is an existential one, the christo-
logical formulation must then point to Jesus'
decisive significance for human existence by
asserting that it is through him that the meaning
of God for us, and hence the meaning of ultimate
reality for us, is decisively re-presented (PC
41-42).
Revisionary christologies thus identify the
Jesus, who is said to be Christ, as the histori-
cal Jesus, i.e., the actual Jesus of history
insofar as he can be known to us today by way
of empirical-historical inquiry using the writ-
ings of the New Testament as sources (PC 16-17).
They are concerned with the determination (by
us) of the identity of the historical Jesus.
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Thus, the subject of the christological assertion
is then inevitably the so-called historical Jesus
(PC 43). Therefore, they argue for the histori-
cal possibility as well as the theological neces-
sity of the quest of the historical Jesus (PC
17).
But Ogden believes, on the contrary, that
the quest of the historical Jesus for christo-
logical assertion is historically impossible
and theologically unnecessary.
Historically, Ogden says, all we can ever
hope to talk about is not what Jesus said and
did, but what Jesus was heard to have said and
seen to have done by those on whom experience
and memory of him are utterly dependent (PC
53). In other words, it is not possible to veri-
fy or falsify conclusively what Jesus has said
or done empirically in purely historical inquiry.
It is, therefore, a doubtful point to take the
historical Jesus as the subject of christological
assertion.
To Ogden, christological assertion may not
be necessarily based on the historical Jesus,
but rather on the stratum of the earliest witness,
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or the apostolic witness to him. This witness
is, in fact, the normative witness of faith
by which the appropriateness of all christological
formulations must be justified (PC 62).
Theologically, even though the quest of the
historical Jesus is historically possible, Ogden
thinks that this quest is not theologically neces-
sary. It is because the real subject of the
christological assertion is not the historical
Jesus, but rather the existential-historical
Jesus which is experienced through the histori-
cal Jesus by the earliest Christian (PC 56).
When they presented their existential experiences,
the writers or redactors of the Gospels were
presenting the existential-historical Jesus.
In other words, the earliest witnesses to
Jesus were not about what Jesus had said and
done, but rather what God had said and done and
was still saying and doing precisely through
Jesus, and hence through their own witness of
faith (PC 59). That is to say, their assertions
were concerned with the meaning of Jesus for
them as he still confronted them in their present
(PC 59).
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From these historical and theological consi-
derations,- can we infer that the apostolic wit-
ness is either historically possible or theologi-
cal revelent for us today? We shall come to
it later.
c) Who is Jesus: the Conditions of Asserting a Chris-
tological Predicate
Revisionary theologians regard Jesus, first
of all, as a human being. They are unable to
meet the problem of the uncertainty involved
in determining who Jesus really was, because,
according to Ogden, there can never be any opera-
tional distinction between Jesus as he really
was and Jesus as he is represented in the earliest
of these sources. The same applies to any talk
about Jesus' own self-understanding (his own
existence as a human person, subjectively), as
distinct from how he was understood to have un-
derstood himself by these same earliest witness
(PC 67).
Thus, Ogden rejects the modern revisionists'
attempt to reconstruct the faith of Jesus, the
religion of Jesus etc. (PC 68). When we want
to infer Jesus' consciousness of self-understand-
26ing from the earliest witness, we meet two diffi-
culties: firstly, the data base that is requir-
ed... indefinitely exceeds what could be rea-
sonably claimed in the case of human being
and secondly, our earliest sources concerning
Jesus provide insufficient evidence of his
inner and outer development (PC 70-71). To
understand one's self understanding or conscious-
ness is difficult and to understand completely
someone's who lived in the past is well nigh
impossible.
Ogden even makes a very sharp distinction
between the primal authority (God) and the self-
understanding (of Jesus or of us) that God autho-
rizes (PC 78). And he thinks that revisionary
christologies obscure this difference in prin-
ciple (PC 79). It is because when revisionary
theologians concentrate on Jesus' self-understand
ing in making their revisionary christologies,
they tends to ignore who authorizes him. As
we have mentioned in chapter one, the christo-
logical question is not simple, but complex.
It is concerned also with the ultimate reality
itself or God himself and its meaning for us.
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Ogden thinks that when we assert that Jesus
is the decisive re-presentation of God, we do
not say or imply how Jesus did understand him-
self but rather how everyone ought to understand
himself or herself. This is why the christo-
logical assertion calls for our decision to ac-
cept it or reject it even today. Therefore,
however Jesus understood himself does not affect
his position to be the decisive re-presentation
of God (PC 78).
In this sense, the titles ascribed to Jesus
in the New Testament, such as Christ, Lord, Son
of Man, Son of God, etc. are all ways of desig-
nating such a decisive representation of God,
thereby authorizing our authentic understanding.
They are, indeed, ways of formulating one and
the same christological assertion of Jesus' de-
cisive significance for human existence (PC 75-
76).
Thus, any ways of asserting that Jesus is
the dicisive representation of the ultimate rea-
lity for us may be justified as an appropriate
christological predicate. And to Ogden, it is
the necessary and sufficient condition of any
such assertion (PC 82). It means that a proper
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christological assertion has two aspects: meta-
physical and moral. It is because without the
metaphysical aspect of such an assertion, the
christology formulation does not provide a firm
base for our understanding of the structure of
the ultimate reality, and without the moral as-
pect, the christology formulated has got no mean-
ing for us to act in relation to our fellow beings
today (PC 82-83).
Now, we have shown how Ogden rejects contem-
porary theologians' attempts to reconstruct revi-
sionary christologies. At the same time, we know
Ogden's requirements in making a proper revisionary
christology. We are now going to present Ogden' s own
christology in the following chapter.
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III HIS CHRISTOLOGY
Now, we come to Ogden's christology. In this
chapter, we shall see how he argues for his christo-
logy of freedom and love to be both appropriate and
credible, by asserting that Jesus is the Liberator.
We expect that this christology of freedom and love
should avoid the difficulties of the traditional
and revisionary christologies emerged. In other
words, it has to be based on the apostolic witness.
At the same time, it should be an assertion that
is concerned with the ultimate reality in relation
to man's self-understanding and self-actualization.
1. Love and Freedom
Ogden uses the concept of love to characterize
the structure of the ultimate reality. Love is a
common experience. It has two poles: loving and
being loved. We experience loving and being loved
by others, by accepting and being accepted by others.
This is part of our relation with others, in acting
on and being acted upon by them. According to Ogden,
the structure o f the ultimate reality or God, by
the analogy of love, is characterized by two poles:
to act on all things and being acted upon by all
things (PC 145). The claim God as the ultimate
reality is boundless love has two meanings. Pri-
marily, it means that we ourselves are free to exist
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and act in love in relation to all our fellow cre-
atures. Secondarily, it means that each of us
is given and called to love beyond all of the limits
of conventional human loving (PC 144-145).
Freedom is another aspect of Ogden's chris-
tology. Ogden believes that our existence today
is determined by both external and internal forces.
Externally, it is the injustices of the society so-
cially, economically, politically and culturally
that makes the majority to be oppressed. Internally,
it is, in existentialist terms, the limited actua-
lization of our possibility of authentic self-un-
derstanding. Thus, negatively, the term freedom
denotes freedom of ourselves from anything, includ-
ing the injustices of the society, that would hinder
unnecessarily our possibility of authentic existence.
Positively, we help others, especially those who
are oppressed socially, economically, politically,
and culturally in the actualization of their possi-
bility of authentic existence. This is the meaning
of liberation.
Therefore, for a contemporary christology,
it is relevant to our situation as well as to human
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existence when Ogden asserts Jesus is the Liberator.
This assertion fits everywhere where freedom is threa-
tened or denied by external or internal forces.
It is an assumption of Ogden that the problem of
human existence, in terms of the limited actualiza-
tion of the possibility of an authentic self-under-
standing is a universal one.
2. Appropriateness
The traditional measures (scripture alone,
both scripture and tradition, Jesus himself--the
so-called historical Jesus) are not suitable accord-
ing to the criteria of appropriateness as the standard
norm in reconstructing christology today (PC 97-98).
We can no longer know exactly what the historical
Jesus was, but we have to reconstruct the origina-
ting witness of the apostles, from the New Testament
writings, to the earliest stratum of Christian wit-
ness (PC 103). It is because the New Testament writ-
ings are not purely historical report, nor primary
sources concerning the historical Jesus. Neverthe-
less, the historical Jesus is the primal authorizing
source of the apostolic witness, which then has
the primary authority derived from it. This is,
in fact,, the only really significant meaning of.
'Jesus' for Christian faith and witness now and
as it was from the beginning (PC 103).
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Having established that the apostolic witness
is the appropriate source of christological assertion,
Ogden proceeds to present a christology of freedom
and love interpreted from the apostolic witness.
Even though Paul may not be regarded as an
apostle in the strict sense of an original and ori-
ginating witness to Jesus Christ, his kerygma can
claim sufficient support in Jesus' own proclamation to be
theologically justified (PC 109-110). It is because
his understanding of Christ's cross and resurrection
as God's decisive act of liberation opens up a
possibility of self-understanding before God. This
self-understanding is the same as Jesus' call to
repentance and faith. Therefore, Paul's kerygma
can be judged appropriate by reference to the real
Christian norm in Jesus himself (PC 110-111). The
message of this kerygma is clearly an existential
one. Thus, we may well assume, even Ogden has not
said explicitly, that the existential concern of
human existence is universal, in spite of different
time, space, and culture.
Mark 1:15 (The time is fulfilled, and the reign
of God is at hand repent, and believe in the gospel.)
bears the witness that Jesus has called for faith
not in his own person, but in his word. This is
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the word of the final judgment of God which has al-
ready been taking place. And Ogden infers that Jesus
proclaims the word of God in order to confront the
hearers to make the decision of their lives, by
definitively interpreting the will of God (PC 115-
117). But who is this God whose word and will are
being proclaimed? The answer Ogden proposes is,
it is the God of boundless love. Jesus represents
love because his proclamation, which calls for repen-
tance, means God's love as the gift and demand of
authentic existence in faith and returning love
(PC 119).
Speaking of Jesus as the Christ or as the Son
of Man (in such terms and catagories as were available
for the purpose),, the earliest Christians affirmed
explicitly what Jesus' implicitly claimed to be,
namely, the decisive revelation of God's love. Ogden
holds that Jesus' own interpretation of such terms
and categories was at most implicit, and that there
was no explicit christology in the earliest stratum
of Christian witness, as was later developed (PC
120).
This earliest witness of the apostles is the
witness of the faith in Jesus, but not a historical
report about him. Therefore, the Gospel observes
not what Jesus was historically, but what Jesus is
to them existentially. Thus whatever assertions
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made about Jesus would be an existential-historical
assertion of what Jesus means, but not what Jesus
meant, in the sense that through him the gift and
demand of God's boundless love are made fully explicit
as authorizing our own possibility of authentic faith
and love (PC 122). The existence of faith through
Jesus is a liberating and a liberated existence.
It is an existence for the freedom of ourselves and
others, and it is also an existence in the freedom
that is the gift and demand of God's love (PC 123).
Thus, Ogden argues that the christology of
freedom and love has got support from the apostolic
witness to Jesus. The christological assertion that
Jesus is the Liberator is appropriate to the apostolic
witness. This christology is also credible to our
situation.
3. Credibility
For our contemporary situation, Ogden believes
that the quest for freedom and justice is the charac-
teristics of modern secular culture. This quest
for freedom has, in fact, determined the whole his-
tory of modern theology in the West (PC 89). People
today throughout the world are increasingly concerned
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with problems of injustice and suppression, which,
in existentialist terms, hinder unnecessarily the
actualization of the possibility of authentic self-
understanding. Christian faith, and hence christo-
logy, thus need a practically credible witness,
beside the metaphysics side, in facing this contem-
porary quest for freedom and justice (PC 93).
In doing so, Ogden uses a theological method
of de-ideologizing and political interpretation
(which is analogous to Bultmann's method of de-my-
thologizing and existential interpretation), with
both a negative and a positive side. The negative
de-ideologizing method is to disengage the aposto-
lic witness from the prevalent ideology of the world
of New Testament time. Ideology means a more or
less comprehensive understanding of human existence,
of how to exist and act as a human being, that func-
tions to justify the interests of a particular group
of individual... (PC 94). Political interpre-
tation aims at explicating the implications of the
Christian witness, specifically political aspect of
moral responsibility (PC 95). The central problem
of politics, in Ogden' s understanding, concerns the
use of power to establish justice, in the state and
government but also throughout the whole social and
cultural order. This is the specifically political
aspect of moral responsibility.
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We are now going to examine how Ogden argues
that his christology of freedom and love can be cre-
dible metaphysically and morally according to common
human experience and reason. It has to be metaphy-
sical because metaphysics, to Ogden, is the form
of critical reflection based on our thought and
speech in the concern of the ultimate (PC 136).
At the same time, it has to be moral because mora-
lity, governs our behaviour and our relation or in-
teraction with other persons in a given society.
Metaphysically, Ogden believes that the chris-
tological assertion Jesus is the Liberator may
be regarded as an assertion about our own existence
(PC 131). It is because, as we have said before,
a christological assertion or answer is concerned
with three inseparable questions, namely, Who is
God? (the question of ultimate reality). Who am
I? (the question of self-understanding), and fin-
ally Who is Jesus? (the question of the relation
between the two). For this third aspect of the chris-
tological question, Ogden has argued that it is ap-
propriate to the apostolic witness.
Ogden is concerned with metaphysics because he
believes that without a metaphysics description of
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the structure of ultimate reality, we can never talk
about God objectively. He proposes to use a tran-
scendental metaphysics which is based on a neo-cla-
ssical one. According to the neo-classical meta-
physics, God is a dipolar God, that is literally
becoming as well as being, and hence the relative
as well as the absolute, the changing as well as
the unchanging, the contingent as well as the neces-
sary (PC 143).
As the ultimate reality, God of boundless love
means basically that we ourselves are free to exist
and act in love in relation to all our fellow crea-
tures (PC 144). God of boundless love means also
that each of us is given and called to love beyond
all of the limits of conventional human loving (PC
144-145). Ogden argues that love has two sides:
to love and to be loved. If to love others is above
all to accept others, and then to act on and be acted upon
by others therefore, the assertion God of bound-
less love implies that this ultimate reality not
only acts on everything, but it is also being acted
on by everything.
It is clear now, after the meaning of the struc-
ture of the ultimate reality has been exp Licated,
that this structure of the ultimate reality or God
is boundless love is credible when judged in terms
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of common human experience and reason (PC 147).
If we have to, distinguish the criterion of credibility,
the above one is the theoretical credibility. There
remains a practical credibility in order to complete
Ogden's proposal.
The formulation that Jesus is the Liberator
is suitable for our situation today when the term
liberation refers to the freedom we have in Christ
(PC 149-150 quoting Gal. 2:4). Before Ogden pre-
sents his idea, he rejects two familiar alternatives
in treating the relation between Christian freedom
and political responsibility.
The first alternative that Ogden rejects is
to identify Christian freedom with secular freedom,
or with political action in the struggle for human
liberation, or the fight for justice for an oppress-
ed majority. Ogden points out that Christian free-
dom is more than merely political action (PC 150-
151).
The second alternative that Ogden rejects is
to separate Christian freedom from political res-
ponsibility. This position emphasizes the spiritual
aspect of the Christian faith it is pessimistic
regarding the future of the society with no hope
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for a better social order despite any efforts to
improve it (PC 152-153).
Having rejected the above two alternatives,
Ogden proposes a third one. That is to distinguish
Christian freedom from political responsibility,
but without separating them (PC 155-156). He argues
firstly that the ultimate ground of Christian free-
dom is the liberating love of God and whose essen-
tial nature is faith working through love (PC 157-
158). Then, our moral responsibility, as our res-
ponse to God's love, or God's demand, is governed
by this love of God. Therefore, the moral implica-
tions of Christian freedom are always to seek jus-
tice (PC 159). Ogden argues further that if the
love through which faith works in turn seeks justice
and finds expression in it, this is clear to say
that Christian freedom does indeed imply political
responsibility (PC 159).
Christian freedom, finally, has got two mean-
ings which can never be confused. Firstly, it means
justice, and hence freedom and equality, throughout
society and culture. Secondly, it means Christians
have the responsibility to help the oppressed maj-
ority to achieve their right (PC 163).
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Thus, the christology of freedom and love,
or the christological formulation that Jesus is the
Liberator is appropriate to the apostolic witness
and is credible metaphysically and morally in our
situation today.
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IV THE CENTRAL PROBLEM
1. The Anostoli Witnese
Having examined how Ogden rejects traditional
and revisionary christologies, which are either inap-
propriate to the earliest Christian witness or incre-
dible to human common experience and reason today,
we, in this chapter, try to understand how Ogden
justifies himself in using the apostolic witness
as an appropriate subject in establishing his exis-
tential christology.
From his early thought, we know that Ogden
has already assumed that the central conviction
of the apostolic witness... intends to express
that in the event Jesus of Nazareth something of
ultimate significance for the whole history of man-
kind has been manifested (CM 160). In other words,
the apostolic witness itself is an existential inter-
pretation of the historical Jesus, who is the bridge
between the ultimate reality and human existence.
On the other hand, the source we have in the
New Testament about Jesus Christ, in fact, is the
apostolic witness to him, but not the so-called histori-
cal Jesus. Therefore, Ogden has to use not the historical
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Jesus, but rather the apostolic witness as the prac-
tical subject in formulating a christological assertion.
Nevertheless, Ogden retains the historical Jesus as
the theoretical foundation of Christianity. We shall
examine this in the following discussion.
As we have shown in chapter one, the christolo-
gical question is an existential question, and thus
a christological assertion is also an existential one.
Any christological assertions by their very nature,
are not only concerned with Jesus, but also God and
human beings together. In the past, the apostolic
witness was indeed, as an immediate experience about
the historical Jesus, presenting their experience to
their fellow people then and there. When these people
accepted such a witness, they became Christians. Pre-
cisely, if we today can hear the apostolic witness
from the past, we may also grasp its existential mean-
ing for us today, assuming that its existential meaning
is the same for all human beings, past or present.
But this need to be explicated by using some philo-
sophical tools, like existential philosophy and process
theology. The existential meaning of the apostolic
witness is credible for us when judged by our common
human experience and reason.
Traditionalists or some revisionists, insist
that the historical Jesus is the proper subject of
any christological assertions. Ogden rejects this.
He thinks, firstly, "there can never be any operational 
distinction between Jesus as he really was and Jesus 
as he is represented in the earliest of these sources"
(PC 67). Since there are no pure historical data con­
cerning Jesus, and all the sources are inevitably pre­
sented by the earliest Christian witness, the quest 
of the historical Jesus will eventually become the 
quest of this apostolic witness (PC 84). Therefore, 
christological assertions need not be based on the 
purely historical Jesus, which creates serious dif­
ficulties, but rather on the apostolic witness itself, 
as recorded in the New Testament.
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Yet, Ogden is aware that the temptation of aban­
doning the historical Jesus as the foundation of Chris­
tianity in his own framework. So, he writes,
the event that the New Testament 
witnesses as such mean in refer­
ring to Jesus does indeed belong 
to the origin of the Christian 
church, and so is an actual hap­
pening, prior to and independent 
of not only their own faith and 
witness, but even the original 
faith and witness of the apostles 
in which everything Christian 
originates. (PC 57)
What this passage wants to state is simply that even 
though the historical Jesus is no longer the real 
subject for christological assertions, the historical
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Jesus is still the origin of the Christian church.
Nevertheless Ogden affirms that when we talk about
Jesus, it is understood that the Jesus we know is
that which comes through the apostolic witness (PC
57).
Furthermore, Ogden rejects the historical Jesus
as the appropriate subject of any christological as-
sertions by replacing it with the apostolic witness.
Concerning the historical Jesus, no matter how they
assumed what Jesus had spoken or acted, the earliest
Christians did not assert it to the christological
claim. It is because they regarded this claim as
not about what Jesus has really spoken or acted but
rather about what God has done through him. In other
word, their assertions are concerned with the meaning
of God through Jesus for us. According to this under-
standing, the Jesus of the apostolic witness is pre-
cisely the existential-historical Jesus, rather
than the so-called historical Jesus (PC 59).
Since both the traditionalists and revisionists
have always insisted that the historical Jesus or
the being of Jesus must be the subject of any chris-
tological assertions, Ogden argues that the being
of Jesus is taken to be the proper subject only when
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we understand that this being of Jesus is related
to the ultimate reality, namely, God. And this shows
the typically existential approach of Ogden, which
leads him to say, the subject of the christological
assertion is Jesus in his meaning for us, not Jesus
in his being in himself (PC 60).
The claim or the assertion thus mentioned above
is understood by the earliest Christians, what it
wants to express is that Jesus is the decisive re-
presentation of God, in the sense of the one through
whom the meaning of God for us, and hence the meaning
of ultimate reality for us, becomes fully explicit
(PC 82).
Following Ogden' s own criticism of the quest
of the historical Jesus, we may ask a parallel question
to the apostolic witness as he does to those questers:
What is really the apostolic witness in the New Testa-
ment? How can we obtain the most primitive apostolic
witness? But to Ogden, I think, this is not an im-
portant question. The apostolic witness functions
to express the faith concerning Jesus as the bridge
between God and human beings. Thus, it does not matter
whether the witnesses are primitive or not, they have
the same function in expressing the ultimate truth
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for us about Jesus
To sum up, Ogden rejects traditionalists and
revisionists using historical Jesus as the base for
any christological assertions because we cannot get
the real picture of the historical Jesus, and what-
ever the christological claims by the earliest Chris-
tians are, they do not assert what Jesus really did
and really was, but what the meaning of this represen-
tation to them is. Therefore, the appropriate chris-
tological subject is not the historical Jesus, but
the existential-historical Jesus understood by the
apostolic witness.
From the above considerations, Ogden goes so
far to say that the empirical-historical Jesus has
no bearing whatever on the point of christology.
Whether Jesus did or did not teach any explicit chris-
tology, the claim made about him... may still be
entirely appropriate (PC 60).
Can we say then that Ogden has the intention,




As Ogden himself admits, one of the most obvious
challenges with particular clarity to his book The
Point of Christology is J. Hick's review article The
Foundation of Christianity: Jesus or the Apostolic
Message?, in The Journal of Religion in 1984 (Ogden
1984g: 1). By responding to this kind of criticism,
Ogden stresses what his intention is. We are now using
their dialogue to examine further the relation between
the apostolic witness and historical Jesus in Ogden's
christology.
The title of Hick's article has already indicated
Hick's point of criticism. It seems to Hick that
Ogden regards the objective historical research and
meaning-for-ourselves to be mutually incompatible
concerns in christology (Hick 1984: 364). Thus, Ogden
removes the responsibility for validating christolog-
ical assertions from the historical Jesus (who does
not, so far as we can discover, uphold a traditional
christology) and places it instead in the preaching
of the New Testament church (Hick 1984: 365).
But, Ogden rejects this challenge, and regards
Hick's criticism to have ignored his pivotal point
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of the christological formulation (Ogden 1984g: 1).
He explains that one should make a very clear distinction
between the two terms the empirical-historical Jesus
and the existential-historical Jesus. That is,
one must distinguish between two different ways of
thinking and speaking about the historical figure
whom we are wont to identify by the proper name 'Jesus'
(Ogden 1984: 2). Thus, no matter how these two terms
are used, they are both rooted in one historical figure,
or the fact of Jesus. In this regard, Jesus does
belong to the origin of the Christian church. The
fact of Jesus is the foundation of Christianity.
To Ogden, the christological claims that are
made or implied about Jesus from the earliest witnesses
are not subject to any empirical-historical control.
He explains, however, that all the claims that Christ-
ians make or imply about Jesus are beyond the control
of empirical-historical inquiry should not be the
only way to establish whether all christological formul-
ation are appropriate even though the empirical-
historical inquiry is very definitely a theological
necessity in some cases (PC 62).
What then is the other way to establish the
appropriateness of formulations? The answer, according
to Ogden, is the apostolic witness.
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Ogden claims that existential-historical Jesus
presupposes the historical Jesus the apostolic is
also grounded in the historical Jesus, although we
may not get a pure picture of that historical figure
through empirical-historical inquiry.
Now it becomes clear that Hick's challenge con-
cerning the foundation of Christianity is valid only
when the historical Jesus and the apostolic witness
are different, or more precisely, when they are mutual-
ly incompatible. Unfortunately, we can have no way
to clarify this problem because no matter how advanced
our historical inquiry is, we can never hope to know
exactly what a historical figure has thought, spoken
or done in his time. The relationship between the
historical Jesus and the apostolic witness is not
simple and different people may have different views.
Nevertheless, Hick's criticism may sharpen when
we take the modern issue of the Christ of Faith
against the Jesus of History into consideration.
As it has been suggested, the christological debates
today tend to repeat= those of the ancient church.
Roughly speaking, the Jesus of history School is parallel
to the Ebionitism of the Antioch School whereas the
Christ of faith School is parallel to the Docetism
of the Alexandria School (Braaten 1984: 518)
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The issue reaches another peak when Hick complains
that Ogden does not at any point in his book mention
the resurrection1, which traditional christology
may use in appealling to history (Hick 1984: 365).
It seems to Hick that Ogden at this point and elsewhere
stands too close to existentialism, by asking mainly
the meaning of Jesus for us here and now, but tends
to neglect or does not do justice to some vitally
important historical issues, whether intended or not.
One may become puzzled when, on the one hand,
Hick complains that Ogden ignores history but on
the other hand, Ogden himself claims that the historical
Jesus is logically prior to the existential-historical
Jesus.
To this point, I think, Ogden does not forsake
Jesus as the foundation of Christianity theoretically
in his christological formulation, because he can
rightly argue that the apostolic witness is based
on the historical Jesus, and thus the issue involved
is not whether the historical Jesus is the foundation
of Christianity, but how we understand the Jesus
1. There are at least two places Ogden mentions re-
surrection in his book (p.110, p.129), but he does
not discuss its significance directly.
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to be this foundation (Ogden 1984g: 3). Nevertheless,
in spite of that,, Odgen has not put the historical
evidence into consideration when proposing his existent-
ial christology. In other words, Ogden's existential
christology has not really given a clear place for
the historical Jesus, but only his existential meaning
to the apostles then and there in the past, and the
meaning for us here and now.
It is ideal if both historical data and existential
meaning can be combined together not only theoretically,
but also practically in formulating a christological
assertion. Since the Christian faith is not independent
from history, otherwise it need not be Christian.
In this sense, Hick's complaint, even though severe,
is still sound. He says,
To some, Jesus means God the Son
dying on the cross to save us
from our sins to some he means
true humanity, open and responsive
to God, calling us to fulfill
our own humanness to Ogden he
means love and freedom to others
he has meant the Aryan Christ
of Nazism, authorizing a savage
persecution of the Jews and so
on. But surely the real signifi-
cance of Jesus cannot be as a
cipher with different meaning
for different people...
(Hick 1984: 366-367).
This historical position of Hick stands clearly apart
from Ogden's existential one. Of course, within Ogden's
love and freedom, there can have no place for the Aryan
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Christ of Naziam, even though they are both presumably
relevant to- some human needs. But what is important
to notice is that Ogden would probably accept other
christologies if they can meet the criteria of both
appropriateness and credibility. On the contrary,
Hick, by insisting on the historical basis of faith,
aims at particular understanding of the historical
Jesus, to make the historical Jesus to be the real
Christian canon, rather than the apostolic witness
as such.
Therefore, in answering Hick's criticism,
Ogden suggests, it is not all the issue of whether
Jesus is the foundation of Christianity it is entire-
ly the issue of what Jesus is rightly said to be
this foundation (Ogden 1984g: 3). In other words,
Ogden regards himself not to have forsaken the his-
torical Jesus in his christological formulation.
It is because the historical Jesus is logically prior
to the existential-historical Jesus, even though
we can hardly know for sure what Jesus has done,
spoken and thought, before the apostles could have
any witness to him at all.
Meanwhile, the apostolic witness, or the ear-
liest Christian witness, no matter how important it is,
is only to serve as an immediate experience of Jesus,
a means for us to establish a christological formulation.
53
This means that the apostolic witness, as Ogden uses
the Jesus is the subject of his christological asser-
tion. To him, the real object of the faith of Chris-
tianity is, in the end still the historical Jesus,
or more precisely the ultimate reality represented
by the historical Jesus. In other words, Ogden dis-
tinguishes the subject of christological assertion
and the object of the faith of Christianity. And,
without doubt, these two terms cannot be separated
because the foundation of Christianity (the historical
Jesus who represents the ultimate reality) can be known




We are going to present some queries about
Ogden's method in formulating his christology in
the first half of this chapter. In the rest of
the chapter, we are concerned with the relevance
of Ogden' s christology to our Asian situation.
Though we cannot provide an. analysis of the Asian
situation here, we may nevertheless attempt to query
the significance of his christology to us.
1. A Methodological Query
We now return to the question raised in
chapter two. Since Ogden believes that the quest
of the historical Jesus is both historically impos-
sible and theological unnecessary, we ask, can
we infer that the apostolic witness is either histo-
rically possible or theologically revelant for us
today? (p. 25). We ask this for the reason that
his christology is based on the apostolic witness
rather than the historical Jesus. In fact, as we
have seen, Ogden believes we should reconstruct
the apostolic witness from the earliest layer of
christian witness through historical-critical study
of the New Testament. At the same time, he justi-
fies the kerygma of Paul, which is not the apostolic
witness in the strict sense, as appropriate one
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theologically because it opens up, in effect, the
same possibility of self-understanding before God
that Jesus called persons to realize.. (PC
111).
It we d 'o not misinterpret Ogden, he has got
two criteria in judging what is appropriate to the
apostolic witness (as stated in chapter one impli-
citly, p. 5). The historicity of the theological
criterion of accepting a witness as the christologi-
cal base does not seem to really matter at all.
In other words, Ogden needs a theological justifica-
tion of the apostolic witness more than its histori-
cal origin, at least, as far as the example of Paul
is concerned.
It is also problematic whether Ogden can de-
termine precisely what the real apostolic witness
is. For example, the sermon of Peter and other
apostles in Acts 2, which is supposed to be part
of the earliest witness about Jesus, was redacted
some decades after their witness. Though Paul him-
self did not bear the witness directly to the his-
torical Jesus, but only the revelation of the risen
Christ (Gal 1: 11-12, Act 26: 13-18), his writings
as we have them in New Testament actually predated
much of the later recorded materials in the Gospels
and Acts. But, without a doubt, Ogden insists that
they are theologically justified as the subject
of rhristoloay.
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If Ogden then reconstructs the apostolic wit-
ness, as he reconstructs the meaning of the kerygma
of Paul, existentially, he inevitably relies on his
own interpretation.' This interpretation follows
the norm of credibility, according to our common
human existence and reason. Furthermore, it is
also questionable whether Ogden arbitrarily chooses
some suitable texts for his own purpose in formula-
ting the christology of love and freedom. Does
Ogden regard other texts concerning the apostolic
witness to be not so primitive? Or are these texts
not really concerned with the apostolic witness?
What are the criteria of such a distinction? Hence,
the quest of the apostolic witness meets the same
historical difficulty as the quest of the historical
Jesus does.
If Ogden, on the other hand, admits that the
apostolic witness he uses is not the most primitive
one, how can he argue for their authority on which
his revisionary christology is based. in Hick's view, if
they are not divinely authorized, we should have
no reason to give such an importance to their me-
lange of ideas, symbols, and myths expressed by
second- and third- generation Christians.. (Hick
1984: 366).
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Nevertheless, we may understand that Ogden
emphasizes the apostolic witness because it is based
on the immediate experience of the historical
Jesus by the earliest Christians. And we can no
longer have this immediate experience. of that
historical figure any more. Thus, the apostles'
experience and interpretation of the historical
Jesus is unique in history, which makes them so
precious to us.
Needless to say, as a contemporary theologian,
Ogden's two criteria of appropriateness and credi-
bility are of his major concerns. He cannot forsake
Christian faith or human reason. This is the reason
why he praises so much Bultmann's de-mythologizing
program, in saying that Bultmann's attempt to find
a right philosophy (existentialism) is a brilliantly
significant method for solving our theological pro-
blem today (Ogden 1966b: 106-108).
It is understood that philosophy requires
human reason and Christian faith is beyond human
reason in some aspects, e.g. to understand the con-
tent of speaking of Jesus as both man and God.
Bultmann's de-mythologizing and existential inter-
pretation program is, in a way, to bridge the an-
cient message of the New Testament and contemporary
philosophy (existentialism). His proposal is thus
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an attempt in solving the difficulties of under-
standing the Christian message today. To Ogden,
the greatness of Bultmann's insight of finding a
contemporary philosophy in explicating the Christian
faith may be compared with Thomas Aquinas' in his
time (Ogden 1966b: 106).
As a revisionary theologian, Ogden finds that
existentialism alone, as Bultmann proposed, is not
enough in explicating the Christian faith. It is
because, by using existentialism, we can never talk
objectively about God, who is the ultimate concern
of the Christian faith. And he finds that process
theology does better in talking objectively about
God. Or we may say that Ogden is in a position
again in relating contemporary philosophy and the
Christian faith which are of his two major concerns.
It is clear that Ogden believes that we can
never know exactly what Jesus really was through
purely historical inquiry. He also believes that
the apostolic witness intends to convey to us that
Jesus Christ is the decisive re-presentation of
the ultimate reality to human beings. And christo-
logy should then be-based on the apostolic witness.
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But, it is questionable whether Ogden does
justice to the Christian faith when he attempts
to construct a christology which is credible to
human understanding as well as appropriate to the
apostolic witness. It is because he puts human
understanding prior to the Christian faith. Will
he then sacrifies some important aspects of the
Christian faith in formulating his christology?
Will he miss, intended or unintended, some important
parts of the apostolic witness? Is it legitimate
to neglect the data of the historical Jesus in formu-
lating a christology? There is an assumption behind
our criticism: even though we cannot know exactly
what Jesus was, the data concerning the historical
Jesus we have got, through historical inquiry, shoulc
not be abandoned completely in our christological
f ormulat ion.
Further, what will be Ogden's attitude if
the apostolic witness has made a mistake or has
missed an important aspect of the historical Jesus
during their interpretation? For example, Jesus
himself lived under an eschatological background
and he was inevitably being affected (Bultmann 1958:
32). It is clear that the apostles was expecting
that Jesus Christ would come back to the earth soon.
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This eschatological expectation is questionable
today for Jesus Christ has not yet come back after
two thousand years! Could the apostles have made a
mistake in believing so?
It seems that Ogden will not then lessen the
importance of the apostolic witness otherwise his
christological ground would be shaken. On the con-
trary, he will probably argue that the apostolic
witness, as the kerygma of Paul, has already made
an existential interpretation of the historical
Jesus. We may infer then that the apostles might
have changed what Jesus was in their witness, accord-
ing to their existential necessity. Or they might
be wrongly expecting that Jesus Christ would come
back soon. In other words, the apostolic witness
thus presented by Ogden need not be appropriate
to the truth of the historical Jesus himself, but
rather be credible to the meaning of the Jesus for
thier existence.
Similarly, we may also query further whether
Ogden does justice to the apostolic witness when
he interprets it in his christological formulation.
For example, resurrection is, at least, a central
theme of the apostolic witness (Act 2: 14-36).
But Ogden has not given a clear place for resur-
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rection in his christology. We may assume again
Ogden will argue that he has also made an existent-
ial interpretation of the apostolic witness to the
resurrection when he is being challenged that he
ignores it in his christological formulation. Other-
wise l he will fall into the difficulty of abandoning
the resurrection.
From the above consideration, it is clear
that Ogden is concerned with the meaning rather
then the historical truth of the historical Jesus
and the apostolic witness. It is because, to Ogden,
whatever the Christian message has to be understand-
able to us and be relevant to our authentic exis-
tence.
Again, in other words, if we do not misinter-
pret Ogden, he has one final criterion, namely,
credibility, instead of two. It is because the
content of Ogden's christology have already deter-
mined what kind of the apostolic witness in the
New Testament he uses. Or this interpretation of
the apostolic witness is according to the criterion
of credibility. When the appropriateness (to the
apostolic witness) is not in harmony with the credi-
bility of our human existence or reason, Ogden is
forced to choose the latter otherwise, his chris-
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tological foundation will be shaken.
Therefore, it is our expectation that Ogden
should include the resurrection and some other his-
torical data concerning the historical Jesus from
historical-critical study of the Bible in his chris-
tological formulation.
2. An Asian Query
As Asians, we are especially concerned with
Ogden's christology of love and freedom, to see
whether it is relevant to our context. Ogden has
not started his christology from the absoluteness
of Jesus Christ, as many theologians do. If the
Christian message starts from the absoluteness of
Christ, it will present many difficulties to Asian
Christians living in non-Christian Asian cultures.
Now, Ogden starts his christologies by identi-
fying the contemporary quest for freedom and justice.
Even though he analyzes the situation in the west,
the quest for freedom and justice applies to the
contemporary Asian situation too. The need for
freedom and justice is universal. In Asia, many
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are deprived of basic human rights. Social, economi-
cal, political, and cultural injustices are rampant
everywhere.
The assertion that Jesus is the Liberator
may thus be very suitable for our Asian situation.
Starting from this common ground, Ogden's christo-
logy would be quite relevant to our context.
Ogden regards that the function of Jesus is
in his decisive re-presentation of the ultimate
reality and its meaning for us. The most important
component is not Jesus in himself, but the ultimate
reality and human existance, which he believes,
in so far as the christological question is concern-
ed. As Asians, we would like to ask the question
of the meaning of decisive. Does it mean,
e.g., that Jesus is the only or exclusive represen-
tation of ultimate reality available to all human-
kind?
Is it possible to replace Jesus by some other
ancient Masters, like Buddha and Confucius, who
might have the same function as Jesus, or the same
position as the decisive re-presentation of the
ultimate reality and its meaning for us?
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If the most primary importance of religion
is the relation between the ultimate reality and
human beings. and hence our authentic existence,
the form of the bridge, or the decisive represen-
tation of the ultimate realtiy for us is only secon-
dary. As Asians, we may very well ask why Jesus
should be the sole bridge between the ultimate reali-
ty and all human beings, including those who do
not know Jesus. In his Western context, it seems
natural for Ogden in their places and times to put
the ultimate reality, self, and Jesus Christ toge-
ther. But, in the Asian context, will Ogden admit
another like Buddha or Confucius to replace Jesus
Christ's position in this series of inseparable
components? Perhaps Ogden will not find it easy
to reject this question on the credibility side.
But by the criterion of appropriateness, how would
he meet this question?
Nevertheless, Ogden's understanding of the
position of Jesus will definitely enrich the dia-
logue of religions and cultures. This, in a way,
might contribute to a critical understanding of the
mission of church in Asia.
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CONCLUSION
To sum up the whole thesis, we have presented
the criteria of appropriateness and credibility
as Ogden's basic concepts in christological formu-
lation. He believes that christology has to be
appropriate to the apostolic witness, which is based
on the historical Jesus. The authority of the apos-
tolic witness thus derives from him. Besides, chris-
tology has to be credible to common human experience
and reason otherwise, it is irrelevant to us.
Based on the earliest witness of Jesus Christ,
Ogden interprets that this witness is an existential
one. It is concerned with three inseparable ques-
tions. They are Who is God?, Who am I?, and
Who is Jesus?. At the same time, knowing the
inadequacy of talking about God objectively in exis-
tentialist terms, he further employs process theology
to explicate the Christian faith by talking about
the structure and moral implication of God or ulti-
mate reality.
Having established these criteria, Ogden re-
jects traditional christologies as well as modern
revisionary christologies. He rejects traditional
christologies because firstly the world view in
the New Testament's time and hence their understand-
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ing of human existence are different from ours.
We can no longer understand their message liter-
ally. Secondly, the metaphysical presuppositions
of these traditional christologies are outmoded.
They can neither do justice to the humanity of
Jesus Christ, nor give any real content of their
talk of Jesus as both God and man.
He rejects revisionary christologies because
they are not so revisionary, but they tend to
stand close with the traditional position by asking
the same question, Who is Jesus?. There are three
point onwhich he believes revisionary theologians are
inadequate. Firstly, they ask Who is Jesus? as
the only question that christology does, instead
of three inseparable questions as Ogden proposes.
Secondly, they treat the historical Jesus as the
subject of christology, but can never know exactly
what Jesus really was. Thirdly, they try to recons-
truct the faith, consciousness, or self-understand-
ing of Jesus in order to make christological asser-
tions to Jesus. But, their reconstructions are
historically impossible as well as theologically
unnecessary. On the other hand, Ogden insists
whatever christological assertions, they should
assert Jesus as the decisive re-presentation of
the ultimate reality and its meaning for us.
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Ogden argues that the assertion Jesus is
the Liberator is appropriate to the apostolic wit-
ness, and is credible to common human experience
and reason. This assertion is appropriate to the
meaning of the apostolic witness because the apos-
tolic witness contains the message of freedom, which
we need today. For credibility, he uses a common
concept, love, to characterize the structure of
ultimate reality. Furthermore, he draws a moral
implication for us from this structure of ultimate
reality.
We discuss the problem of the apostolic wit-
ness and the historical Jesus, as a methodological
consideration of Ogden's christology in chapter
four. Ogden argues that we can no longer know ex-
actly what the historical Jesus really was. Any
christology which is based on the historical Jesus
will be at the risk of historical uncertainty.
On the other hand, he believes that the historical
Jesus is theologically unneccessary in formulating
a christology. It is because historical fact and
the interpretation of this fact are not in the same
level. What we today need is the theological con-
struction concerning the historical Jesus by the
apostles, i.e., the apostolic witness, or the exis-
tential-historical Jesus. It is because this wit-
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ness forms the Christian canon. Christology today
should then be appropriate to that Christian canon.
Ogden further clarifies his stand point about
the apostolic witness when J. Hick challenges that
Ogden forsakes Jesus Christ as the foundation of
Christianity. Ogden argues that the existential-
historical Jesus of the apostolic witness is rooted
in the historical Jesus, even we cannot know him
exactly.
From the above argument, we observe that Ogden
does not forsake Jesus as the final foundation of
christology and Christianity theoretically. But
Hick, on a historical side, challenges that Ogden
practically ignores resurrection, a historical fact
concerning Jesus, in his christology.
In the final chapter, we query whether Ogden
has got one final criterion of credibility among
the two. It seems that he has set up what he re-
gards as credible for today before he interprets
some apostolic witness in the New Testament, in
formulating the christology of love and freedom.
It is also questionable whether Ogden can get the
real apostolic witness. We believe that the quest
for the apostolic witness meets the same historical
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difficulty as well as the quest for the historical
Jesus. It is because there are many layers of the
earliest Christian witnesses that we cannot identi-
fy which is the most primitive one among all the
earliest witnesses, even though we may find them
out historically.
Finally, we appreciate Ogden's christology
by asserting Jesus is the Liberator. It is because
in our Asian context, everywhere people need free-
dom, especially in a unjust society. Ogden's under-
standing of Jesus' position, as the decisive repre-
sentation of the ultimate reality and its meaning
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